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FROM IGNORANCE TO UNCERTAINTY: 
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
PIETRO B A R O N I , GIOVANNI G U I D A AND SILVANO M U S S I 
This paper aims to develop an analysis of how ignorance affects the reasoning activity 
and is related to the concept of uncertainty. With reference to a simple inferential reasoning 
step, involving a single piece of relational knowledge, we identify four types of ignorance and 
show how they give rise to different types of uncertainty. We then introduce the concept of 
reasoning attitude, as a basic choice about how reasoning should be carried out in presence 
of ignorance. We identify two general attitudes, analyze how they are related to different 
types of ignorance, and propose some general requirements about how they should affect 
the reasoning activity. A formalism for uncertain reasoning explicitly including the different 
types of uncertainty identified and satisfying the stated requirements is finally introduced 
and its performance is analyzed in simple examples. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In artificial intelligence literature most attention has always been focused on knowl-
edge, on the analysis of its nature, on its characterization, and on its role in intelligent 
reasoning process. More specifically, in the uncertain reasoning field, knowledge has 
been advocated as the primitive concept from which the concept of belief should 
be derived, as clearly and explicitly stated in (7]. According to this standpoint, 
uncertain reasoning is nothing else but a special case of reasoning with "certain" 
knowledge. Certain (logical) reasoning is assumed, in a sense, as the fundamental 
and perfect form of reasoning, in relation to which uncertain reasoning is perceived 
as an imperfect exception. The goal of this paper is to propose a different point of 
view about reasoning under uncertainty, with a particular attention to the role of 
ignorance. In particular, we emphasize the role of ignorance in determining a state of 
imperfect knowledge. Ignorance can be generally characterized as lack of knowledge: 
as we will show, different types of knowledge may be lacking and different lacks of 
knowledge affect the reasoning activity differently. Our fundamental claims are: 
- reasoning is based on the exploitation of the knowledge available on the domain 
of interest and is limited by the ignorance existing about the same domain; 
- the existence of ignorance makes the use of available knowledge not definitely 
reliable, giving rise this way to the concept of uncertainty: uncertainty is 
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therefore a way to take into account the ignorance that affects the knowledge 
we use in гeasoning processes; 
- since ignorance inextricably pervades any possible domain of interest (we can 
never be sure that our knowledge about a given subject is definitely complete), 
human reasoning is in its essence uncertain; 
- certain reasoning is only a conventional and synthetic representation - indeed 
very useful in practice - to deal with those cases where uncertainty is expected 
to have a negligible role. 
The paper is conceptually oгganized as follows. First, we introduce a simple 
schematization of the basic structure of a geneгic inference step, considered as the 
fundamental constituent of a reasoning process. We propose then a basic charac-
terization of how ignorance may affect an inference step, showing that there exist 
vaгious types of ignorance. Next we propose an analysis of how different types of ig-
norance affect the activity of reasoning under uncertainty, introducing the concept of 
reasoning attitude. The proposed ideas are framed in a (preliminary) representation 
and reasoning formalism, whose behavior is analyzed in some simple examples. 
2. A SIMPLE INFERENCE STEP 
In a very simple and basic formulation, a generic inference step, considered as the 
fundamental constituent of a reasoning process, involves: 
- an individual, that is the specific subject of interest to which the inference step 
is applied; 
- a piece of relational knowledge which states the relation between two pгoperties 
relevant to the individual considered: the former property is called premise and 
the latter consequence; 
- an inference mechanism which allows to infer that, if an individual has the 
property stated in the premise of the relation, then the individual has also the 
property stated in the consequence. 
Using гelational knowledge to reason about an individual, requires therefoгe the 
following three steps: 
- verifying, exploiting the information available about an individual, whether he 
has the property stated in the a premise of the chunk of relational knowledge 
considered; 
- if the individual has such a property, assuming that the chunk of relational 
knowledge can be applied to the individual; 
- deгiving then the consequence of the application of the chunk of relational 
knowledge to the individual and ascribing to him the property stated in the 
consequence. 
This simple scheme holds when an ideal state of perfect knowledge is assumed 
(we assume that knowledge is perfect when it has all intuitively desirable properties, 
i.e. it is complete, consistent, error free, etc). Let us bгiefly examine the meaning of 
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this assumption. According to the schematization proposed above, an inference step 
involves four basic elements (namely: the individual, the premise, the consequence, 
and the relation between the premise and the consequence) and two activities involv-
ing them (namely: verifying the match between the individual and the premise and 
then adding the consequence to the set of known facts). Therefore the assumption 
of an ideal state of perfect knowledge implies: 
- perfect knowledge about the individual, i.e. about all its properties relevant 
to the matching with the premise; 
- perfect knowledge about the premise, i.e. about all properties which make the 
relation applicable to an individual; 
- perfect knowledge about the relation between the premise and the consequence; 
- perfect knowledge about the consequence, i.e. about all properties which are 
entailed by the premise. 
In [7] the case of imperfect knowledge is identified with the concept of belief: a 
belief about a proposition <p is characterized as "the agent knows that either <p is the 
case or else some specific (perhaps unusual) circumstances obtain". Therefore the 
concept of imperfect knowledge is somehow reduced to that of exception: knowledge 
degrades itself to belief when it admits exceptions. The concept of exception is also 
the background on which nonmonotonic reasoning theories have been built. Default 
rules are rules with exceptions, as stated, for instance, in [10]: "The sentence 'Birds 
fly' is not synonymous with 'All birds fly' because there are exceptions". 
However, the presence of exceptions is not, in general, the only possible cause 
of imperfection in knowledge. In particular, we emphasize the role of ignorance in 
determining a state of imperfect knowledge. Ignorance can be generally characterized 
as lack of knowledge: as we will show, different types of knowledge may be lacking 
and different lacks of knowledge affect the reasoning activity differently. 
3. TYPES OF IGNORANCE 
Let us start our analysis by supposing that we are interested in an individual, say 
Tom, and that our knowledge base includes just the following relations: "winged 
birds fly", "liver disease DIS1 requires drug DR1", "liver disease DIS2 requires drug 
DR2". 
3.1. Ignorance about the individual 
In order to start any reasoning activity, we need first of all some knowledge about 
the individual. This knowledge - or, more generally, part of it - may however be 
lacking. If we simply ignore if Tom is a bird or a man, we can not infer anything 
about Tom. Moreover, our knowledge may also be partially lacking: for instance we 
might know that Tom is a bird, but ignore if it is winged or not, as well as we may 
know that Tom suffers from his liver, but we may ignore which is the disease that 
causes such problems. 
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3.2. Ignorance about the premise 
Considering now the premise, we may partially ignore the properties which underlie 
the relation we are interested in. For instance, being a bird is not a sufficient premise 
for deducing that an individual can fly. However, we are unable to enumerate all 
additional conditions which would be necessary to completely specify this premise 
(for instance, we should mention in the premise all the cases of exceptional birds: 
penguins, ostriches, caged birds, etc). Similarly, we may ignore some additional 
conditions that make a drug ineffective in restoring health (in fact, in some cases, a 
drug may fail to give the desired effects)/ 
3.3. Ignorance about the relation 
As far as the relation between the premise and the consequence is concerned, let us 
first state that such a relation represents, in very general terms, an understanding of 
an aspect of a specific domain (the zoological domain for "birds fly", or the medical 
domain for the other relations considered). Such understanding is based on other 
chunks of knowledge concerning the same domain. For instance, the fact that drug 
DR1 is useful for disease DIS1 is based on the fact that chemical components of 
DR1 contrast the negative effects D1S1 has on liver cells. However, in many cases 
such detailed knowledge is lacking. For instance, a statistical correlation may be 
detected between a (supposed) cause and an effect, but there is no clear physical 
understanding of the causation mechanism. On the other hand, one may be able 
to build a very sound physical model which explains why and how a certain cause 
should produce a given effect, but experimental evidence supporting the model may 
be lacking, either because experimental data are contradictory or simply because 
new, ad hoc, experiments should be carried out to verify the theory and such an 
experimentation campaign requires a lot of time and money. Of course other more 
and more complicated cases may happen; for example, given a new drug both ex-
perimental results and a suitable physical model may be available to support its 
use for a certain disease, but both experimental results and the physical model may 
be questioned by a group of scholars who can provide a different interpretation of 
the same data, in the frame of an alternative model. Anyway, such lack of basic 
domain knowledge should strongly affect our feeling about the considered relation. 
First of all, one might wonder whether such a piece relational knowledge, lacking 
sufficient support or understanding, should definitely remain in the knowledge base 
and be used for reasoning purposes. Moreover, one might feel that such a piece of 
knowledge should not be treated the same way as a well-grounded relation such as 
"birds fly". 
3.4. Ignorance about the consequence 
Finally, also ignorance about the consequence should be considered. If one verifies 
that a given premise holds, he is generally interested in all relevant facts that can 
be derived from the premise. Of course, this interest is strongly context dependent; 
in the case of birds, one can simply neglect, without problems, the fact that being 
a bird also implies being feathered or making eggs. But in the case of drugs, one 
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is very interested in all side-effects they may have, that, especially for very recent 
drugs, are often ignored. In such cases, there is a very strong need of specifying all 
the consequences of a given premise, and, of course, it may happen that some of 
them are ignored. 
4. FROM IGNORANCE TO UNCERTAINTY 
After having provided the above classification of different types of ignorance, let us 
examine how different kinds of ignorance differently affect the reasoning process and 
give rise to different kinds of uncertainty. In general, we mean that a reasoner is in 
a condition of uncertainty when she/he is unable to answer, in a definite and not 
defeasible way, a given question she/he is interested in. In other words, a reasoner 
is in a condition of uncertainty when she/he has some reasons to believe that the 
assertions she/he makes will need to be revised in the future. Of course in absence of 
ignorance, i.e. in the ideal case of complete and perfect knowledge, every question 
has its right answer and all the conclusions derived from the reasoning process are 
certain, in the sense that they are grounded on a stable basis and there is no reason 
to doubt that they may be questioned in the future. In fact, since there is no 
ignorance, no new knowledge elements can be acquired, that could induce to retreat, 
modify, or extend previously derived conclusions. On the contrary, if we admit the 
presence of ignorance, we must also admit that our knowledge can be improved, if 
our ignorance can be reduced. Therefore, we are also constrained to accept that our 
conclusions can be retreated, modified, or extended. In a sense, our conclusions are 
never definitive, and, for the time being, they should be considered only as certain 
to a given degree, i.e. as intrinsically uncertain. Therefore, ignorance originates 
uncertainty. When carrying out an inference step there are different questions to 
be answered and different types of knowledge to be used. Therefore different kinds 
of ignorance should be considered, that differently affect the reasoning process and 
give rise to different kinds of uncertainty, as we discuss in the next sections. 
4.1. Ignorance about the individual 
Let us consider first the ignorance about the properties of the individual, called I-
ignorance for short. Such properties are considered in the matching phase, in order 
to verify whether the relation applies to the individual. Let us assume, for the sake 
of simplicity, that the choice about the application of a piece of relational knowledge 
is two-way, i.e. either the relation is completely applicable or it is not applicable 
at all. Therefore, /-ignorance implies that the choice to apply or not to apply the 
relation is considered as retractable. For instance, if one just knows that Tom is an 
animal, he is not reasonably allowed to apply to Tom the relation "birds fly", but if 
he later learns that it is a bird, the relation turns out to be applicable. However, if 
subsequently it turns out that Tom is a penguin, the conclusions derived from the 
incorrect application of the relation should be retreated. 
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4.2. Ignorance about the premise 
Turning to ignorance about the premise, called P-ignorance for short, if not all 
the conditions which should correctly be included in the premise are known (or 
specified), it happens that, even if an individual matches with the properties stated 
in the premise, it is not guaranteed that the relation can be safely applied. For 
instance, if one ignores that drug DR1 is useful for disease DIS1 only in absence 
of disease DIS2 (perhaps because DR1 has never been experimented on patients 
suffering from both diseases), DR1 can be prescribed to a patient suffering from 
DIS1 even if it is known that he suffers from DIS2 too. Therapy results or the 
acquisition of more detailed knowledge will however show that the prescription is 
incorrect, because the relation should not be applied to such an individual. 
Note that both /-ignorance and P-ignorance affect the matching between an 
individual and the premise of a relation, i.e. involve the applicability of the relation 
to the individual. In fact they affect the answer to the question: "Should the relation 
be applied to the individual?" and in both cases the acquisition of further knowledge 
may show that the relation was not correctly applied to the individual. Therefore, 
considering their effect on the reasoning activity, both /- and P-ignorance make 
uncertain the fact that a given relation should be applied to a given individual, 
i.e. they produce a unique type of uncertainty that concerns the applicability of a 
relation, called A-uncertainty for short. 
4.3. Ignorance about the relation 
Let us consider now ignorance concerning the relation between the premise and the 
consequence. This type of ignorance does not involve any more the individual and 
solely affects the relations itself. Consider, for example, the case of a drug to which 
a positive effect on a given disease was ascribed. If it is learned that some recoveries, 
initially ascribed to its chemical properties, were, in fact, due to a placebo effect, 
this new knowledge leads to suppress the relation between the drug and the disease 
from the knowledge base, as not valid. As it is clear, this suppression makes invalid 
all the inferences previously drawn based on the relation, independently from the 
individuals to which they were applied. In this case not only the application of the 
relation to some special individuals is questioned, but the general validity of the 
relation itself is challenged. Therefore we call this kind of ignorance /-ignorance, 
i.e. ignorance affecting the validity of a relation. V-ignorance affects the question 
"Is my knowledge reliable?" and produces K-uncertainty, i.e. it makes uncertain the 
fact that a given relation should be considered valid and included in the knowledge 
base. 
4.4. Ignorance about the consequence 
Finally, ignorance may concern also the consequence of a relation, C-ignorance for 
short. Let us note that this kind of ignorance concerns the fact that one may fail 
to identify all the relevant facts entailed by the premise. Thus, if, for instance, 
one learns about previously unknown side effects of a given drug, he should extend 
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previously drawn deductions in order to take into account the new consequences. 
C-ignorance affects the question "Am I overlooking any important consequence?" 
and produces C-uncertainty, i.e. it makes uncertain that all the relevant deduc-
tions have been drawn in the reasoning process. Therefore, differently from A- and 
V-uncertainty, it does not involve the potential retraction of a previous choice but 
just the extension of the deductions made. In other words, it directly affects the 
completeness of the reasoning results rather than their correctness. However, com-
pleteness may indirectly affect correctness (so requiring retractions) when the new 
drawn conclusions interact with the premise of a relation affected by A-uncertainty, 
i.e. when the new conclusions make inapplicable a previously applied relation. 
In the above discussion we have outlined how different types of ignorance give rise 
to different types of uncertainty. This distinction is, in our opinion, of fundamental 
importance for modeling uncertain reasoning, since different types of uncertainty 
have different properties and, most importantly, affect the reasoning activity differ-
ently, as we will discuss in next section. 
5. IGNORANCE AND REASONING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
5.1. Background 
Let us now focus on how the various types of uncertainty defined above can affect 
the reasoning activity. Before proceeding, it is necessary to better define what we 
mean by reasoning activity, in fact, in presence of uncertainty, at least two basic 
interpretations are possible: 
- the reasoning activity has the goal of ascribing truth values to propositions, 
however, due to the presence of uncertainty, such truth values are defeasible; 
- the reasoning activity has the goal of ascribing an uncertainty quantification 
to pairs < proposition, truth value>. 
The former interpretation is the standpoint adopted by symbolic approaches, while 
the latter is the basic assumption of quantitative approaches. 
5.2. At t i tudes in reasoning in symbolic approaches 
In a symbolic approach when evaluating an inference step in presence of ignorance 
two basic choices are possible: 
- to suspend reasoning, i.e. to renounce to draw any conclusion, until new 
knowledge is acquired; 
- to carry out inference anyway, admitting however, that it can be subsequently 
refuted. 
In this context, we say that the former choice corresponds to a conservative attitude 
while the latter to an evolutive attitude. The choice between the two attitudes seems 
very natural in some situations. For instance, in case we just know that Tom is an 
animal, we adopt a conservative attitude and renounce to assume that it could be a 
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bird and therefore that it could fly. On the other hand, if we know that Tom is a bird, 
we adopt an evolutive attitude and we are easily inclined to assume that it is not an 
abnormal bird and, therefore, that it can fly. The choice between a conservative or 
an evolutive attitude might be related to the type of ignorance; however, the limited 
expressive capabilities of symbolic approaches do not allow a satisfactory explicit 
representation of these aspects. In fact, in symbolic approaches, any proposition is 
regarded (defeasibly) just as true or false and any relation is regarded just as valid 
or not (i.e., it is included in the currently used knowledge base or not). The simple 
criteria for choosing between conservative or evolutive attitude adopted in symbolic 
approaches can therefore be stated as follows: 
- In case of /-ignorance, a conservative attitude is adopted; if the available 
knowledge about an individual does not allow to match it with the premise, the 
relation is not applied. This is intuitively justified by the fact that adopting 
an evolutive attitude in this case would lead to apply almost any relation 
to almost any individual, which is, in general, unacceptable. In fact, such 
choice could lead to contradictory - or at least counterintuitive - conclusions. 
Moreover, if the reasoning activity is costly, this choice may turn out to be 
fairly uneconomical. 
- In case of P-ignorance, an evolutive attitude is adopted; even if the premise is 
not completely specified, if it matches with the properties of the individual and 
nothing explicitly prevents the deduction, the relation is applied. This is the 
case of typical default rules [10], where in presence of admittedly incomplete 
premises, defeasible conclusions are drawn anyway. This is intuitively justified 
by the fact that adopting a conservative attitude in this case would lead to 
block inference in almost any practical reasoning situation. In fact, relations 
for which it is actually possible to define a complete premise (i.e., for which it 
is possible, for instance, to enumerate all possible exceptions) are very rare in 
practice. 
- The case of K-ignorance can not be dealt explicitly with within the frame of 
symbolic approaches. Practically, if a doubted validity relation is included in 
the knowledge base, an evolutive attitude is adopted; whereas if the relation 
is excluded from the knowledge base, this corresponds to adopt a conservative 
attitude. Therefore, in this case, the choice about which attitude to associate 
to a relation is actually committed to the person in charge of building the 
knowledge base, and is not explicitly dealt with at reasoning level. 
- Finally, in the case of C-ignorance, a conservative attitude is adopted; on-
ly explicitly stated consequences are considered. Similarly to the case of I-
ignorance, this is justified by the fact that adopting an evolutive attitude 
would lead to derive any consequence from a relation. 
As a conclusion, from the analysis of how the four types of ignorance affect the 
choice of the most appropriate attitude to take in a given inference step, it can 
be hypothesized that a basic principle of reasoning economy underlies the choice 
of the attitude. In all cases, the attitude is selected that prevents either an exag-
gerated extension or a drastic reduction of the reasoning activity. In the case of 
From Ignorance to Uncertainty: A Conceptual Analysis 113 
ignorance about validity, the choice is left outside reasoning process and delegated 
to an external authority, the knowledge base builder. 
5.3. Attitudes in reasoning in quantitative approaches 
Let us extend now our analysis to quantitative approaches. First of all let us stress 
that this analysis is carried out at an abstract level, without reference to any spe-
cific existing formalism. Let us consider a generic quantitative formalism, in which 
uncertainty quantification (say q) ranges, as it is indeed very usual, over the real 
interval [0,1], where 1 represents intuitively the maximum certainty and 0 the min-
imum (null) certainty. For the sake of generality, given a proposition P that may 
assume the truth values {true, false}, we assume that uncertainty quantification 
about P is represented by a pair of distinct (though not necessarily independent) 
values [q(P, true), q(P, false)]. 
Similarly, for a relation R the complete characterization of the uncertainty about 
R requires two distinct quantifications: 
- a quantification associated to the fact that R is applicable or not applicable 
to an individual I, represented by a pair [q(applicable(R, I), true), 
q(applicable(R, I), faise)]; 
- a quantification associated to the fact that R is valid or not, represented by a 
pair [q(valid(R), true), q(valid(R), faise)]. 
It has to be noted that, while validity quantification depends only on the relation 
R, applicability quantification depends both on R and on the individual I to which 
it is applied. Moreover we do not consider here quantification of C-uncertainty. 
Such quantification would concern the fact that the consequence of the relation 
is completely specified or not. In other words, it does not concern the actually 
drawn conclusions but an estimation about the existence of other relevant conclu-
sions that have not been drawn, due to C-ignorance. Therefore, a quantification of 
C-uncertainty represents a judgement about the completeness of drawn conclusions 
rather than on their credibility. Even if this aspect is very interesting and may also 
be very important in many applications, we do not further investigate it in this 
paper, leaving it for future work. 
The goal of a reasoning step in the frame of quantitative approaches can now 
be stated as follows: "Given a relation R and a fact F about an individual I, such 
that F matches with the premise of R, derive from the uncertainty quantifications 
[q(F, true), q(F, false)], [q(applicable(R, I), true), q(applicable(R, I), faise)], and 
[q(valid(R), true), q(valid(R), faise)] the proper uncertainty quantification 
[q(G, true), q(G, faise)] about a fact G, corresponding to the consequence of the 
relation." Therefore, in order to characterize the reasoning activity, the role played by 
six different components in determining [q(G, true), q(G, faise)] has to be defined. 
Let us examine them individually: 
- The component q(F, true) represents intuitively the belief degree that F holds, 
i.e. that I has the property stated in the premise, therefore the higher 
q(F, true) the higher should be q(G, true). 
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- The component q(F, false) represents intuitively the belief degree that F does 
not hold, i.e. that I has not the property stated in the premise and, therefore, 
that the rule does not apply to I. A conservative attitude is appropriate in this 
case: if the rule does not apply to the individual because it has not the required 
properties, nothing should be inferred about the consequence. Therefore the 
higher q(F, false) the lower should be q(G, true) and q(G, false). 
- The component q(applicable(R1 I), true) represents intuitively the belief de-
gree that R is applicable to a generic individual, in other words it represents 
the certainty that the premise is completely specified and that there are no 
exceptions to the relation. Of course, if the premise is completely specified 
and there are no exceptions, given the premise it is sure that the consequence 
holds. Therefore, the higher q(applicable(R) I), true) the higher should be 
q(G, true). 
- The component q(applicable(R, I), false) represents intuitively the belief de-
gree that R is not applicable to a generic individual, i.e. the certainty that the 
premise is not completely specified and that the relation admits (several) ex-
ceptions. The role played by this component depends on our attitude towards 
exceptions: in a conservative attitude nothing is assumed about an exception, 
whereas in an evolutive attitude it is assumed that if an individual is an ex-
ception, the negation of the consequence holds. Both attitudes make sense, 
the choice depending mainly on the nature of the relation at hand and on 
context dependent conditions. Therefore, in a conservative attitude the higher 
q(applicable(R, I), false), the lower should be both q(G> true) and q(G, false), 
whereas in an evolutive attitude the higher q(applicable(R, I), false), the high-
er should be q(G, false). 
- The component q(valid(R), true) represents intuitively the belief degree that 
the relation is valid, i.e. that it is founded on a solid understanding of the 
domain at hand. Therefore, the higher q(valid(R), true) the higher should be 
q(G, true). 
- The component q(valid(R), false) represents intuitively the belief degree that 
the relation is not valid, i.e. that it could be erroneous and should be canceled 
from the knowledge base. In this case a conservative attitude is appropriate: 
in absence of the relation itself, nothing can be inferred. Therefore, the higher 
q(valid(R), false), the lower should be both q(G, true) and q(G, false). 
Given these general requirements, we propose in the next section a preliminary pro-
posal of a quantitative formalism which is appropriate to model uncertain reasoning 
taking into account the six uncertainty quantifications illustrated above. 
6. A PARADIGM FOR REASONING WITH A- AND V-UNCERTAINTY 
The proposal presented here has to be considered as very preliminary and aims 
more to substantiate some basic ideas than to introduce a new general and well-
settled formalism for uncertainty management. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that facts about individuals are represented by propositions and that relations are 
represented in form of IF-THEN production rules. 
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6.1. Quantified propositions 
First of all, let us introduce the concept of belief: a belief is an evidential judgement 
about the credibility of the truth values ({true, faise} in the case of ordinary two-
valued logic) assigned to a proposition. Beliefs may assume values in an ordered set 
of belief degrees. For the sake of simplicity, we assume here the real interval [0,1] 
as the set of possible belief degrees. It is important to underline that, in our pro-
posal, the concept of belief degree is related to the intuitive concept of "amount of 
evidence" supporting the credibility that a certain proposition should have a certain 
truth value. So, given an available body of evidence E, bej£?(Pi, true) = 0 means 
that there is null (or negligible) evidence supporting the credibility that proposition 
Pi has the truth value true, and this is totally different from excluding that true 
is a possible truth value for Pi . Similarly, bej£;(Pi, true) = 1 means that avail-
able evidence fully supports the credibility that proposition Pi has the truth value 
true, and this is again totally different from being absolutely certain that true is 
the correct truth value of Pi. If we now consider a proposition and compute the 
belief degrees for all its possible truth values, we obtain a global representation of 
the uncertainty about which truth value should be assigned to the proposition, on 
the basis of the, available evidence. Therefore, given a proposition Pi and a body 
of evidence E, the belief state of P\ under E, denoted by beis#(Pi), is the pair 
(bei£;(Pi, true), b e i ^ P i , faise), (say (btpx,bfpx) for short). The belief state repre-
sents therefore how much one is authorized to believe in the association between a 
given proposition and its possible truth values, on the basis of the available evidence. 
A proposition accompanied by the relevant belief state is called a quantified proposi-
tion: more formally, for any proposition Pi, the pair (Pi, belsE(Pi)) is a quantified 
proposition. Intuitively, if we are fully convinced, on the basis of available evidence, 
that a proposition is true, this will be represented by the belief state (1,0), whereas 
the opposite conviction will be represented by (0,1). Moreover we can represent a 
state of total ignorance about a proposition (due to a lack of evidence) with the belief 
state (0,0), which indicates the absence of evidence both supporting the value true 
and the value false. On the contrary, if we have, for any reason, strong evidences for 
both the values true and false, we can represent this contradictory situation by the 
belief state (1,1). Of course, all intermediate situations are possible, since the two 
components of a belief state are independent. 
6.2. AV—quantified relations 
According to the discussion presented in Section 4.3 and to the concepts introduced 
in Section 5.1, given a relation R represented as a production rule if Pi then Pi it 
is possible to quantify it with a pair of belief states: 
- an _4-belief state, denoted by A-belsE(R), defined as the pair: 
(belE(applicable(R, I), true), belE(applicable(R, I), false)) 
related to the applicability of the rule (also denoted as (btappR, bfappR) for 
short); 
- a V-belief state, denoted by V-belsE(R), defined as the pair: 
(belE(valid(R), true), belE(valid(R), false)) 
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related to the validity of the rule (also denoted as (btvalR, bfvalp) for short). 
The subscript E refers to the overall amount of evidence, possibly collected along 
years of experience, from which a general evaluation about the applicability and 
validity of a rule can be derived. The elicitation of these evaluations may be very 
critical in real knowledge acquisition tasks. We refer here to an ideal case, where all 
such evaluations are actually available. 
The pair (A-belsE(-R), V-belsE(R)) is called the .AV-belief state of the relation 
R and denoted by AV-belsE(R). A relation accompanied by the relevant AK-belief 
state is called an AV-quantified relation: more formally, for any relation R} the pair 
(R} AV-belsE(R)) is an Ay-quantified relation. 
6.3. A formalism for reasoning with AV-quantified relations 
According to what stated in Section 4.3, given a relation R represented through a 
production rule if Pi then P2> a basic reasoning step consists in deriving the belief 
state beis£;(F2) from belsE(Pi), given the AV-belsE(R). A simple way of doing this 
derivation, in accordance with the requirements stated in Section 3.3 and adopting 
an evolutive attitude as far as applicability is concerned is the following: 
btp2 = btpY • btappR • btvalR • (1 — bfpx) • (1 — bfvai/?) 
bfp2 = btPl • bfappR • btvalR • (1 - b f p j • (1 - bfvain) 
Let us note that the validity of these formulas strongly relies on the assumption 
that the two components of a belief state are completely independent. The intu-
itive meaning of the proposed formulas can be better appreciated through a simple 
example. Consider first the case of the relation "smoke causes cancer": it admits 
(rare) exceptions but is fully valid, therefore assume its A-belief state is (0.8,0.1) 
and its V-belief state is (1,0). Suppose now it is known with certainty that Tom is 
a smoker, i.e. bels ("Tom is a smoker") = (1,0). Using the above reported formulas 
it is then possible to derive the belief state bels ("Tom catch cancer") = (0.8,0.1). 
Therefore, intuitively, we are strongly convinced that Tom will catch cancer, but we 
leave also a little space to the opposite hypothesis. Note also that, since P-ignorance 
is associated to an evolutive attitude, the sum of the components of bels ("Tom catch 
cancer") equals that of bels("Tom is a smoker"). Suppose now that evidence about 
Tom being a smoker is not so strong: you just have some reasonable suspects that he 
smokes, and, possibly, you have also some clues supporting the opposite persuasion. 
Therefore, the belief state about Tom being a smoker is in this case bels( "Tom is 
a smoker") = (0.7,0.1). Using the above reported formulas it is then possible to 
derive beis("Tom catch cancer") = (0.504,0.063). Intuitively, in this case the pres-
ence of/-ignorance, associated to a conservative attitude, causes a reduction of both 
components of bels ("Tom catch cancer") so that their sum is not preserved through 
the reasoning step. This reflects the fact that, in a conservative attitude, ignorance 
affects the amount of belief transferred to the consequence, whereas in an evolutive 
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attitude it just affects the belief distribution between the two components. One 
might wonder why, in this case, we have a lower belief in the fact that Tom does not 
catch cancer. This is coherent with our concept of belief as amount of evidence and 
with the conservative attitude: in fact, we have less reasons to believe anything that 
can be derived from the application of this relation. Consider now the (quite unlike-
ly) case that the fact that smoke is really related with cancer is questioned by some 
authoritative scholar. We have therefore a new F-belief state (1,0.3), expressing 
the significant contradiction between the two opinions. Considering again the case 
where bels("Tom is a smoker") = (1,0), using the above reported formulas it can 
be derived that bei ("Tom catch cancer") = (0.56,0.07). The effects of V-ignorance 
with conservative attitude are analogous to those of I-ignorance. 
7. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have developed an initial analysis of the different types of igno-
rance that may concern our knowledge and of the relations between ignorance and 
the uncertainty affecting inferential reasoning. Within this framework, we have then 
outlined a preliminary proposal of a quantitative formalism to model uncertain rea-
soning in presence of A- and V-uncertainty. 
The main goal of the analysis developed in this paper has been to establish an 
ample framework, where the concept of uncertainty can be better placed and under-
stood. In fact, from a practical perspective, it is very important that when facing 
a knowledge acquisition and modeling task in a specific domain, the knowledge en-
gineer is aware of the different types of ignorance and of uncertainty he might be 
requested to deal with: he should be able to correctly identify and classify them, in 
order to avoid gross representation errors and improper knowledge use. In many chal-
lenging application domains the capability of distinguishing among different types 
of ignorance and of uncertainty is crucial, and a deep understanding of the different 
roles they play is necessary to correctly and effectively reproduce expert knowledge 
and reasoning. 
Even if the considerations developed in this paper are not far from common in-
tuition, they seem to defy some consolidated assumptions lying behind most of the 
approaches that can be found in current literature about uncertain reasoning. As 
we mentioned above, uncertainty about a relation is commonly associated exclusive-
ly to the presence of exceptions; also in the very rich and complete survey of Lea 
Sombe [6] uncertainty about a relation between propositions refers to the presence 
of exceptions only. Our analysis shows that uncertainty about a relation is more 
complex and raises the exigency of having, in the general case, a richer and more 
detailed representation for the uncertainty that may affect a relation than for uncer-
tainty affecting a proposition. However, as far as we know, none of the most known 
quantitative approaches to uncertain reasoning meets such requirement. 
In approaches based on probability theory, a probability value is associated 
both to propositions and to relations, expressed through conditional probabilities 
in Bayesian networks [9] or through logical implication relations in probabilistic 
logic [1, 5, 8]. Therefore, both uncertainty concerning propositions and relations is 
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represented the same way, actually through a single number. No explicit specifica-
tion is given about the kind of uncertainty the proposed representation is intended 
to capture, even if it seems to be strictly related to the concept of _4-uncertainty. 
In possibilistic logic [4], a real number representing possibility or necessity is 
associated to propositions and to relations (relations are simply propositions of the 
form -*Pi V P2). Also in this case, no explicit specification is given about the kind 
of uncertainty the proposed representation is intended to capture; moreover, the 
distinction between possibility and necessity, which is quite clear for propositions, 
does not seem to carry a definite and well understood meaning for relations. Consider 
the example presented in [4]: the rule "If John comes tomorrow, it is rather likely 
that Albert will come" is represented by (-»comes(John, m)Vcomes(Albert, m)) (N = 
0.6), whereas the rule "Someone will come to the meeting whose presence may 
(highly possibly, but not certainly at all) make the meeting not quiet" is represented 
by (-^comes(a)m) V -*quiet(m)) (= 0.8). In these cases the distinction between the 
possibility and the necessity of a relation seems to be rather a matter of subtlety 
in the use of words than of really different concepts, and it is easy to imagine that, 
asking different persons, they will express almost the same knowledge using different 
words such as: "If John comes tomorrow, it is possible, but not certain at all that 
Albert will come" or "Someone will come to the meeting whose presence is highly 
likely to make the meeting not quiet". If knowledge analysis criteria are not specified, 
it is rather difficult to avoid the risk of an imprecise, and possibly even meaningless, 
use of the formalism. 
In Dempster-Shafer theory (D-S theory), uncertainty quantification applies to 
subsets of the frame of discernment (i, e., a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
hypotheses). Uncertainty quantification for a subset of the frame of discernment 
consists of a pair of real numbers, representing respectively the belief and the plau-
sibility that the correct hypothesis belongs to the subset. Uncertainty quantification 
is derived from a basic belief assignment, which associates to each subset a belief 
mass corresponding to a given chunk of evidence. When distinct chunks of evidence 
are available, global uncertainty quantification is obtained through Dempster's rule 
of combination. However, as it was clearly pointed out by [11], "Representing even 
simple patterns of generic knowledge in a D-S framework may become highly prob-
lematic". Different ways for representing uncertain knowledge in D-S theory have 
been proposed, such as associating basic belief mass to implication relations [3, 14], 
or associating directly belief and plausibility to implication relations [11, 12]. In 
both cases, however, no different representation is provided for propositions and for 
relations. 
Turning now to the concept of attitude proposed in Section 5, it should be noted 
that this issue has received only very limited attention in the past. In most symbolic 
and quantitative approaches to uncertain reasoning, the strategies underlying the 
reasoning mechanism adopted are just left implicit, whereas they are a key factor 
to verify the suitability of an approach in a given application domain. In general, 
it can be recognized that probability theory relies on a strongly evolutive attitude, 
since, in propagation, probability which is not assigned to an hypothesis is forced to 
be assigned to its negation. Possibilistic logic and D-S theory offer a relaxation of 
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this strong evolutive at t i tude: both allow the representation of uncommitted beliefs, 
since necessity (or equivalently belief) of a proposition and of its negation are not 
forced to sum up to 1 . Therefore, a range of different at t i tudes could be represented 
in these approaches by modulating, in the propagation, the amount of uncommitted 
belief. However, as far as we know, this aspect has not been outlined and satis-
factorily explored in the past . Consider for instance Dempster 's combination rule: 
it implicitly adopts a conservative at t i tude about the belief ascribed to the whole 
frame of discernment, but an evolutive at t i tude about the belief ascribed to 0 which 
is redistributed among all the focal elements . Such evolutive at t i tude is no more 
present if one adopts an unnormalized representation [13] where it is possible to 
ascribe a non null belief to 0. Further studies are needed in this direction: in par-
ticular the choice of normalized vs. unnormalized beliefs (and of normalizing or 
non-normalizing rules) should be explicitly represented and under the control of the 
reasoner, rather than being a design parameter embedded in the formalism. In this 
way, the most appropriate representation and rule could be dynamically selected 
and applied, depending on the current reasoner at t i tude. As a mat ter of fact, belief 
functions and probability theory seem more appropriate to accomodate such kind of 
extensions than probability theory . 
Without entering a larger debate, which would be beyond the scope of the paper, 
it is possible to remark, in general, tha t the existence of different at t i tudes suggests 
the possibility of defining different propagation schemes within a single representa-
tion approach . This way, the automated reasoning mechanisms should be able to 
switch from a scheme to another according to the current a t t i tude . This contrasts 
with the habit of defining an uncertainty representation and reasoning approach as 
the combination of a representation and of a unique propagation scheme, considered 
as generally valid for this representation. 
The results discussed in this paper should be considered as preliminary achieve-
ments. Several issues will deserve specific attention in future developments. Among 
the most challenging and promising topics we mention: 
- the analysis of the concept of ignorance, the identification of specific classes of 
ignorance, and the study of the relations between ignorance and knowledge; 
- the study of the principles tha t govern the selection of the most appropriate 
att i tudes to be adopted in an inference step; 
- a closer characterization of the nature of yl-uncertainty and of C-uncertainty. 
(Received November 7, 1997.) 
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